Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
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Publication:1189670
DOI10.1007/BF01271133zbMath0763.90037MaRDI QIDQ1189670
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
boundary-value problemsystem of singular differential equationscontinuous sealed-bid auctionset of Nash-equilibria
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (26)
On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions ⋮ Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction ⋮ First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge ⋮ Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs ⋮ Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions! ⋮ Asymmetric auctions with resale: an experimental study ⋮ Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case ⋮ All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. ⋮ Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions ⋮ The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions ⋮ Multidimensional private value auctions ⋮ First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model ⋮ Asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study ⋮ Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction ⋮ On ring formation in auctions ⋮ Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions ⋮ A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations ⋮ Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions
Cites Work
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- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
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