A unique solution to \(n\)-person sequential bargaining

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90013-IzbMath0773.90096MaRDI QIDQ1189696

Geir B. Asheim

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

subgame-perfect equilibriumtwo-person sequential bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (10)

Acquisition war-gaming technique for acquiring future complex systems: modeling and simulation results for cost plus incentive fee contract ⋮ Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games ⋮ Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem ⋮ Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining: experimental evidence from Germany and China ⋮ Optimistic stability in games of perfect information ⋮ Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Pledge-and-review bargaining ⋮ A unique solution to \(n\)-person sequential bargaining ⋮ AN n-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME ⋮ A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol

Cites Work

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• Non-cooperative bargaining of \(N \geq 3\) players
• The unique perfect equilibrium of an \(n\)-person bargaining game
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• A unique solution to \(n\)-person sequential bargaining
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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