The exponential convergence of Bayesian learning in normal form games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1189698
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90015-KzbMath0772.90087MaRDI QIDQ1189698
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Nash equilibriumexponential convergenceprior beliefsBayesian learning processesgeneral finite- player, finite-strategy normal form games
Related Items
Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games, Learning from others: A welfare analysis, Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games?, Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games., Learning communicative actions of conflicting human agents, Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance, Convergence conditions for the Brown-Robinson iterative method for bimatrix games
Cites Work
