Equilibrium refinement in psychological games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90016-LzbMath0761.90106OpenAlexW2089476919MaRDI QIDQ1189699

V. W. Kolpin

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90016-l

zbMATH Keywords

proper equilibriaperfect equilibriabelief-dependent emotions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cognitive psychology (91E10) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (2)

Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ Dynamic psychological games

Cites Work

• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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