Maximal strategy sets for continuous-time game theory
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1190242
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90082-SzbMath0772.90090MaRDI QIDQ1190242
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Noncooperative games (91A10) Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24) Games of timing (91A55)
Related Items (6)
Developing real option game models ⋮ Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games ⋮ Large extensive form games ⋮ Viscous demand. ⋮ Trees and extensive forms ⋮ Continuous-time games of timing
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
- Borel structures for function spaces
- Bayesian information topologies
- Informational structure for differential games
- A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games
- The convergence problem for differential games
- Equilibria of a two-person non-zerosum noisy game of timing
- Dynamic noncooperative game theory
- A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games
- Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
- Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
- Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
- Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior
- Sequential Equilibria
- Some Measurability Results for Extrema of Random Functions Over Random Sets
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Existence of Saddle Points in Differential Games
This page was built for publication: Maximal strategy sets for continuous-time game theory
