Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90088-YzbMath0761.90025MaRDI QIDQ1190249

Dilip Mookherjee, Stefan Reichelstein

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaauctionsmechanism designdominant strategiesbilateral bargainingunique implementationintrafirm resource allocationprocurement contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (27)

Mixed bundling auctions ⋮ Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade ⋮ Optimal combinatorial mechanism design ⋮ Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers ⋮ Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions ⋮ Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement ⋮ Mechanism design with a restricted action space ⋮ Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research ⋮ Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints ⋮ Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality ⋮ On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types ⋮ The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism ⋮ Calendar mechanisms ⋮ Optimal collusion with internal contracting ⋮ On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem ⋮ Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Banning bidders from all-pay auctions ⋮ On the equivalence of Bayesian and deterministic dominant strategy implementation ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading ⋮ Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate ⋮ Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results ⋮ (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) ⋮ On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities ⋮ A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation ⋮ Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection ⋮ A note on optimal allocation with costly verification ⋮ Optimal Monopoly Mechanisms with Demand Uncertainty

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• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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