On perfectness concepts for bimatrix games

DOI10.1007/BF01783500zbMath0771.90104OpenAlexW2030820896MaRDI QIDQ1190390

P. E. M. Borm

Publication date: 26 September 1992

Published in: OR Spektrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01783500

zbMATH Keywords

stable setpersistent equilibriumproper equilibriumperfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items

Competitive environments and protective behavior ⋮ Fall back equilibrium for \(2 \times n\) bimatrix games ⋮ Fall back equilibrium ⋮ An amalgation of games

Cites Work

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• Strictly perfect equilibrium points of bimatrix games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
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• On constructing games with a convex set of equilibrium strategies
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept