Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope

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Publication:1190600

DOI10.1007/BF01586041zbMath0773.90059MaRDI QIDQ1190600

Uriel G. Rothblum

Publication date: 26 September 1992

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)




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