A new axiomatization of the Shapley value

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Publication:1191817

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90014-6zbMath0755.90095OpenAlexW1969010088MaRDI QIDQ1191817

Youngsub Chun

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90014-6




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