Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90015-8zbMath0755.90008OpenAlexW2088675186MaRDI QIDQ1191818

Andrew Postlewaite, Richard P. McLean

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90015-8

zbMATH Keywords

corepure exchange economiesexcess functionsnucleolus allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (5)

A prekernel characterization by means of stability properties ⋮ The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies ⋮ The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets ⋮ An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments ⋮ THE CORE COINCIDES WITH THE NUCLEOLUS ALLOCATIONS IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY WITH TAXATION

Cites Work

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• On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation
• Mathematical methods of game and economic theory
• Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Cores
• Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
• An Elementary Core Equivalence Theorem
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
• The Coefficient of Resource Utilization

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