Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
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Publication:1191820
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90017-1zbMath0755.90110OpenAlexW2142874299MaRDI QIDQ1191820
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90017-1
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