Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90018-3zbMath0755.90107OpenAlexW1977953904MaRDI QIDQ1191821

Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90018-3

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationtwo-sided matching processes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (25)

Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms ⋮ Two-sided matching with interdependent values ⋮ The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments ⋮ Decision-making with reference information ⋮ Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Matching markets under (in)complete information ⋮ Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms ⋮ Lexicographically maximal edges of dual hypergraphs and Nash-solvability of tight game forms ⋮ Unique stable matchings ⋮ A dynamic school choice model ⋮ The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game. ⋮ Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets ⋮ Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets ⋮ Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange ⋮ Group stability in matching with interdependent values ⋮ Stability with one-sided incomplete information ⋮ School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms ⋮ Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty ⋮ An advanced parking navigation system for downtown parking ⋮ In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm ⋮ Self-selection in school choice ⋮ Protective behavior in matching models ⋮ Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences ⋮ The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges

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• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
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• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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