A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1192631
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90024-9zbMath0825.90806OpenAlexW1982876675MaRDI QIDQ1192631
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90024-9
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Cites Work
- Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- The chain store paradox
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
