Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90008-3zbMath0751.90089OpenAlexW2022114102MaRDI QIDQ1192639

Larry Samuelson

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90008-3

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric gamespure strategy Nash equilibriumlimit evolutionarily stable strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (9)

The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions ⋮ Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games ⋮ On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests ⋮ Three steps ahead ⋮ Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games ⋮ Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games ⋮ Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory ⋮ Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games ⋮ Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games

Cites Work

• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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