Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90024-OzbMath0755.90099OpenAlexW2077453922MaRDI QIDQ1193752

Rangarajan K. Sundaram, Jeffrey S. Banks

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90024-o

zbMATH Keywords

finite automatameasure of complexityNash equilibria in 2-player repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) 2-person games (91A05) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• The strength of a little perfection
• Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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