Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90025-PzbMath0754.90083OpenAlexW2081489611MaRDI QIDQ1193753

S. Singh

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90025-p

zbMATH Keywords

stable setsprisoner's dilemmacoordination gametwo-period games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Inefficient stage Nash is not stable, Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria, Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice

Cites Work

• Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria