Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1193766
DOI10.1007/BF00134151zbMath0825.90817MaRDI QIDQ1193766
Amnon Rapoport, John C. Howard, Rami Zwick
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (5)
A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time ⋮ INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING ⋮ Bargaining and boldness ⋮ The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management ⋮ Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points
Cites Work
- On the robustness of perfect equilibrium in fixed cost sequential bargaining under an isomorphic transformation
- Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
This page was built for publication: Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown
