Subjective expected utility theory revisited: A reductio ad absurdum paradox
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Publication:1193769
DOI10.1007/BF00133980zbMath0825.90267MaRDI QIDQ1193769
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine
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