The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies
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Publication:1193774
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90010-RzbMath0753.90088OpenAlexW1989538212MaRDI QIDQ1193774
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90010-r
Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems (90C60) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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