Classical statistics as a theory of incentives

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90011-IzbMath0753.90016OpenAlexW2085511009MaRDI QIDQ1193775

Edward J. Green

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90011-i

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian-Nash equilibriumlikelihood-ratio contractsprincipal-agent situations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents

Cites Work

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• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game

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