Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90015-MzbMath0753.90085OpenAlexW2069681584MaRDI QIDQ1193781

Amnon Rapoport, Eythan Weg, Dan S. Felsenthal

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90015-m

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative gamesubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

Replicator dynamics of symmetric ultimatum game ⋮ A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time ⋮ Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end ⋮ Fairness motivation in bargaining: a matter of principle ⋮ Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown ⋮ Bidding games and efficient allocations ⋮ Foundations of ambiguity models under symmetry: \(\alpha\)-MEU and smooth ambiguity ⋮ Economic harmony -- a rational theory of fairness and cooperation in strategic interactions ⋮ Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining ⋮ On the robustness of perfect equilibrium in fixed cost sequential bargaining under an isomorphic transformation ⋮ Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points

Cites Work

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• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining
• Non-cooperative games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Sequential Equilibria
• The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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