Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90029-EzbMath0755.90098MaRDI QIDQ1194053

Geir B. Asheim

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

infinite horizon gamesPareto-perfect equilibriumPareto-perfect social norm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (10)

A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games ⋮ The market for conservation and other hostages ⋮ FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES ⋮ Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games ⋮ Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games ⋮ Renegotiation in repeated games ⋮ Bargaining power in repeated games ⋮ Renegotiation in repeated games with side-payments ⋮ Justifiable punishments in repeated games ⋮ Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games

Cites Work

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• Deriving strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria from an abstract system
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games

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