Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90043-RzbMath0756.90015OpenAlexW1987331192MaRDI QIDQ1194259

David Reitman, Reiko Aoki

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90043-r

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot competitiontwo-sided incomplete informationpartial pooling equilibriaR\&D game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (2)

Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse ⋮ Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket

Cites Work

• A note on the strategic adoption of a new technology
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Market Structure and Innovation
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
• Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior
• Sequential Equilibria

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