Coalition formation under limited communication

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90046-UzbMath0762.90095MaRDI QIDQ1194262

Edward C. Rosenthal

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitycoalition formationcommunication gamerestricted communicationnonempty coresinduced communications networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (3)

Bargaining power in communication networks ⋮ An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable ⋮ A value with incomplete communication

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Communication and its cost in graph-restricted games
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• Values of Graph-Restricted Games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• On the core of linear production games
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

This page was built for publication: Coalition formation under limited communication