Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90047-VzbMath0825.90828OpenAlexW2060486649MaRDI QIDQ1194263

Daniel J. Seidmann

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90047-v

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (3)

The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games ⋮ Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information ⋮ Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Communication between rational agents
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Credible debate equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission

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