Folk theorems in overlapping generations games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90048-WzbMath0764.90104OpenAlexW2016792078MaRDI QIDQ1194264

Lones Smith

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90048-w

zbMATH Keywords

overlapping generationsfinite-lived playersperfect folk theorems for repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (14)

The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies ⋮ Labor union members play an OLG repeated game ⋮ Arbitrage, strategic inefficiency and self-regulation ⋮ Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents ⋮ Evolution game model of travel mode choice in metropolitan ⋮ Overlapping generations games with growing payoffs ⋮ A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players ⋮ A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games ⋮ Cooperation in an overlapping generations experiment. ⋮ Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games ⋮ Cooperation in stochastic OLG games ⋮ Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality ⋮ Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior ⋮ Decentralized matching and social segregation

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
• Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

This page was built for publication: Folk theorems in overlapping generations games