On self-enforcement in extensive-form games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90049-XzbMath0764.90096OpenAlexW2024390822MaRDI QIDQ1194265

Joergen W. Weibull

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90049-x

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfectionself-enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (2)

Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior ⋮ On self-enforcement in extensive-form games

Cites Work

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• On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
• On self-enforcement in extensive-form games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality
• Sequential Equilibria

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