Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90037-SzbMath0770.90089OpenAlexW2111875179MaRDI QIDQ1195595

Benny Moldovanu

Publication date: 12 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90037-s

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationcoalition-proof Nash equilibria3-person noncooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

• Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
• Bargaining conventions
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Bargaining in cooperative games
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• The Core of an N Person Game
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