Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90034-PzbMath0775.90310MaRDI QIDQ1195599

Toshiyuki Kimura, Mamoru Kaneko

Publication date: 12 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (max. 100)

`NEXT' events: a cooperative game theoretic view to festivals ⋮ Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players ⋮ On the existence of a stable convention and a generalized Stackelberg equilibrium ⋮ Stability and segregation in group formation ⋮ Discrimination in festival games with limited observability and accessibility ⋮ Strategic behavior and the persistence of discrimination in professional baseball

Cites Work

• The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments
• Dynamic models of segregation†
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