The compromise value for NTU-games
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Publication:1196124
DOI10.1007/BF01245460zbMath0766.90095OpenAlexW1567097059MaRDI QIDQ1196124
Hans Keiding, S. Oortwijn, S. H. Tijs, P. E. M. Borm, Richard P. McLean
Publication date: 7 December 1992
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01245460
Related Items (13)
A note on the characterizations of the compromise value ⋮ A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure ⋮ The compromise value for cooperative games with random payoffs ⋮ On the axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value ⋮ Unfair allocation of gains under the equal price allocation method in purchasing groups ⋮ The general compromise value for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games ⋮ A NON-COOPERATIVE BARGAINING PROCEDURE GENERALISING THE KALAI-SMORODINSKY BARGAINING SOLUTION TO NTU GAMES ⋮ Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility ⋮ The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems ⋮ Compromise values in cooperative game theory ⋮ Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games ⋮ NTU PERT games
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