On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games. Symmetry versus asymmetry

DOI10.1007/BF01245461zbMath0758.90091OpenAlexW2095209587MaRDI QIDQ1196125

S. Singh

Publication date: 7 December 1992

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01245461

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuebargaining powernon-transferable utilityHarsanyi solutionnon-symmetric Nash solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• On Harsanyi's solution
• A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
• On non-transferable utility games with coalition structure
• Weighted coalition structure values
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
• An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
• On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples
• On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation
• Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game

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