Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
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Publication:1196175
DOI10.1007/BF00182575zbMath0760.90004OpenAlexW2079027140MaRDI QIDQ1196175
Publication date: 17 December 1992
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00182575
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