Fully revealing outcomes in signalling models: An example of nonexistence when the type space is unbounded

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90103-OzbMath0759.90013OpenAlexW1987058163MaRDI QIDQ1196195

Martin F. Hellwig

Publication date: 17 December 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90103-o

zbMATH Keywords

signalling model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (3)

Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications ⋮ Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? ⋮ Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games

Cites Work

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Informational Equilibrium

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