Predicting the effects of intervention and sabotage in a bounded complex game

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(92)90066-EzbMath0757.90095WikidataQ113186400 ScholiaQ113186400MaRDI QIDQ1196273

Håkan J. Holm

Publication date: 16 December 1992

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

finite automataNash-equilibriumtwo-person repeated prisoners' dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• The complexity of computing best-response automata in repeated games
• The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies
• Small talk and cooperation: A note on bounded rationality
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata

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