Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90003-DzbMath0753.90004MaRDI QIDQ1196625

John V. Howard

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumkingmaker treealternative vote proceduremethod of descending chainssingle transferable vote system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

A characterization of proportionally representative committees

Cites Work

• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Choosing from a tournament
• Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
• Dominance solvable games and trees
• A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Some Aspects of Elections--To Fill One Seat or Many

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