Resale-proofness and coalition-proof Nash equilibria

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90004-EzbMath0755.90096OpenAlexW1975956751MaRDI QIDQ1196626

Shigeo Muto

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90004-e

zbMATH Keywords

information trading gameperfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibriaresale-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

The Shapley value of resale-proof trades ⋮ TECHNOLOGICAL FAILURE, ECONOMIC SUCCESS ⋮ Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market ⋮ Information-sharing in social networks ⋮ Stable payoffs in resale-proof trades of information ⋮ Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Stable payoffs in resale-proof trades of information
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• An Information Good Market with Symmetric Externalities
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