Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
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Publication:1196644
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90020-1zbMath0754.90081OpenAlexW2093565303MaRDI QIDQ1196644
Debraj Ray, B. Douglas Bernheim
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90020-1
Related Items (34)
On the possibility of stable renegotiation ⋮ Complementary institutions and economic development: an experimental study ⋮ Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model ⋮ An axiomatization of plays in repeated games ⋮ The market for conservation and other hostages ⋮ Time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals ⋮ Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency ⋮ FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES ⋮ The three-legged race: Cooperating to compete ⋮ Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types ⋮ Dynamically consistent voting rules ⋮ The impossibility of stable renegotiation ⋮ Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium ⋮ Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting ⋮ Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting ⋮ Renegotiation-proof relational contracts ⋮ Renegotiation perfection in infinite games ⋮ Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems ⋮ Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ On being honest and behaving honestly ⋮ Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games ⋮ Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games ⋮ Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games ⋮ One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify Stackelberg equilibrium ⋮ Renegotiation in repeated games ⋮ Bargaining power in repeated games ⋮ Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games ⋮ Theories of coalitional rationality ⋮ Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets ⋮ The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency ⋮ Renegotiation in repeated games with side-payments ⋮ Justifiable punishments in repeated games ⋮ Credible public policy ⋮ Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games
Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Finitely Repeated Games
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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