Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90022-MzbMath0754.90084MaRDI QIDQ1196653

Barton L. Lipman, Sanjay Srivastava

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesmeasure of strategic complexity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

A strong anti-folk theorem ⋮ Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria ⋮ Computability, complexity and economics

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• The strength of a little perfection
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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