Implementing a public project and distributing its cost

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(05)80044-4zbMath0763.90031OpenAlexW2018926394WikidataQ56609434 ScholiaQ56609434MaRDI QIDQ1196663

S. Singh

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(05)80044-4

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (25)

The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison ⋮ Sharing sequential values in a network ⋮ A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments ⋮ Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players ⋮ Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics ⋮ Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities ⋮ An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities ⋮ Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models ⋮ An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value ⋮ Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games ⋮ On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information ⋮ Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule ⋮ Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments ⋮ Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities ⋮ Smooth multibidding mechanisms ⋮ Choosing and sharing ⋮ The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games ⋮ Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types ⋮ Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism ⋮ Efficient private production of public goods under common agency ⋮ A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good ⋮ A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation ⋮ Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods ⋮ Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.

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• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
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