Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
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Publication:1196667
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(05)80048-1zbMath0756.90011OpenAlexW2095580670MaRDI QIDQ1196667
Anne P. Villamil, Stefan Krasa
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(05)80048-1
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Cites Work
- Financial intermediary-coalitions
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
- The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Reply
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