Suboptimality of M-step back strategies in Bayesian games

DOI10.1007/BF01240252zbMath0773.90105OpenAlexW1996856798MaRDI QIDQ1196703

S. C. Young, James Q. Smith

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240252

zbMATH Keywords

calibrationstochastic gamesBayesian rationalityprisoner's dilemmaBayesian gamesBayes optimal strategyrepeated two player games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Object-oriented Bayesian networks for a decision support system for antitrust enforcement

Cites Work

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• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Subjective Probability and the Prisoner's Dilemma
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Deriving and Analysing Optimal Strategies in Bayesian Models of Games

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