Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote

DOI10.1007/BF00192880zbMath0761.90022OpenAlexW2044564031WikidataQ60530923 ScholiaQ60530923MaRDI QIDQ1196713

David Austen-Smith, John R. Wright

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00192880

zbMATH Keywords

interest group lobbying

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (12)

Screening and Signaling in Communication* ⋮ Expert advice to a voting body ⋮ Legislative informational lobbying ⋮ Influencing a polarized and connected legislature ⋮ Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production ⋮ Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure ⋮ Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying ⋮ Information transmission and inefficient lobbying ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with costly messages ⋮ Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections ⋮ Delegation and the regulation of risk ⋮ Information disclosure with many alternatives

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