Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(92)90073-IzbMath0762.90003MaRDI QIDQ1197649

Denis Bouyssou

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

oligarchiesaggregation procedureArrow's impossibility result

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Pointwise aggregation of maps: its structural functional equation and some applications to social choice theory ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators

Cites Work

• On realizable biorders and the biorder dimension of a relation
• Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
• Partially Ordered Sets
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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