Player importance and forward induction

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90073-8zbMath0759.90099OpenAlexW2074215886MaRDI QIDQ1198130

Asha Sadanand, Venkatraman Sadanand, Amin H. Amershi

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90073-8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumforward inductionequilibrium selection problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (4)

Ideal reactive equilibrium ⋮ Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction ⋮ Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions ⋮ Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk

Cites Work

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• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Sequential Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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