Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90009-2zbMath0753.90090OpenAlexW2006069523MaRDI QIDQ1198164

Dov Samet, Itzhak Gilboa

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90009-2

zbMATH Keywords

two-person repeated gameconnected finite automata

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (11)

The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen. ⋮ Speculative and hedging interaction model in oil and U.S. dollar markets -- phase transition ⋮ Imperfect equilibrium ⋮ Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory ⋮ Nash equilibrium strategies in repeated games with and without cost of implementation ⋮ Computer science and decision theory ⋮ Model-based learning of interaction strategies in multi-agent systems ⋮ Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium ⋮ Speculative and hedging interaction model in oil and U.S. dollar markets -- long-term investor dynamics and phases ⋮ Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in a family of randomly generated repeated games.

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games

This page was built for publication: Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak