Weighted coalition structure values

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90011-0zbMath0753.90079OpenAlexW2013486699MaRDI QIDQ1198167

Anat Levy, Richard P. McLean

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90011-0

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingweighted Shapley valuesaxiomatizationscoalition structurestransferable utility games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (17)

Harsanyi support levels solutions ⋮ Solidarity in games with a coalition structure ⋮ The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation ⋮ On non-transferable utility games with coalition structure ⋮ Random order coalition structure values ⋮ On the symmetric and weighted Shapley values ⋮ On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games. Symmetry versus asymmetry ⋮ The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions ⋮ Values and coalition configurations ⋮ The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure ⋮ New axiomatizations of the Owen value ⋮ Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures ⋮ The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES ⋮ THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE

Cites Work

• On weighted Shapley values
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
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