Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
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Publication:1198182
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90016-8zbMath0752.90014OpenAlexW2023926079MaRDI QIDQ1198182
George J. Mailath, Peter B. Zemsky
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90016-8
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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