The market game: Existence and structure of equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(92)90005-RzbMath0762.90011OpenAlexW2144368506MaRDI QIDQ1198385

James Peck, Karl Shell, Stephan E. Spear

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(92)90005-r

zbMATH Keywords

canonical market game interior Nash equilibrium strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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