Weakly implementable social choice rules

DOI10.1007/BF00134093zbMath0766.90003OpenAlexW2029961501MaRDI QIDQ1200530

Larry Samuelson, Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134093

zbMATH Keywords

strong Nash equilibriaminimum path independenceminimum resolutenessmultivalued social choice rulespartial implementabilitypervasive veto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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