Nash equilibrium strategies in repeated games with and without cost of implementation

DOI10.1016/0167-6377(92)90072-BzbMath0767.90096OpenAlexW2008559136MaRDI QIDQ1200774

Alejandro Neme, Luis G. Quintas

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(92)90072-b

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
• Repeated games with finite automata
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Nash equilibrium strategies in repeated games with and without cost of implementation